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Background: Mitigation of the spread of infection relies on targeted approaches aimed at preventing nonhousehold interactions.
Contact tracing in the form of digital proximity tracing apps has been widely adopted in multiple countries due to its perceived
added benefits of tracing speed and breadth in comparison to traditional manual contact tracing. Assessments of user responses
to exposure notifications through a guided approach can provide insights into the effect of digital proximity tracing app use on
managing the spread of SARS-CoV-2.
Objective: The aim of this study was to demonstrate the use of Venn diagrams to investigate the contributions of digital proximity
tracing app exposure notifications and subsequent mitigative actions in curbing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in Switzerland.
Methods: We assessed data from 4 survey waves (December 2020 to March 2021) from a nationwide panel study (COVID-19
Social Monitor) of Swiss residents who were (1) nonusers of the SwissCovid app, (2) users of the SwissCovid app, or (3) users
of the SwissCovid app who received exposure notifications. A Venn diagram approach was applied to describe the overlap or
nonoverlap of these subpopulations and to assess digital proximity tracing app use and its associated key performance indicators,
including actions taken to prevent SARS-CoV-2 transmission.
Results: We included 12,525 assessments from 2403 participants, of whom 50.9% (1222/2403) reported not using the SwissCovid
digital proximity tracing app, 49.1% (1181/2403) reported using the SwissCovid digital proximity tracing app and 2.5% (29/1181)
of the digital proximity tracing app users reported having received an exposure notification. Most digital proximity tracing app
users (75.9%, 22/29) revealed taking at least one recommended action after receiving an exposure notification, such as seeking
SARS-CoV-2 testing (17/29, 58.6%) or calling a federal information hotline (7/29, 24.1%). An assessment of key indicators of
mitigative actions through a Venn diagram approach reveals that 30% of digital proximity tracing app users (95% CI 11.9%-54.3%)
also tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 after having received exposure notifications, which is more than 3 times that of digital
proximity tracing app users who did not receive exposure notifications (8%, 95% CI 5%-11.9%).
Conclusions: Responses in the form of mitigative actions taken by 3 out of 4 individuals who received exposure notifications
reveal a possible contribution of digital proximity tracing apps in mitigating the spread of SARS-CoV-2. The application of a
Venn diagram approach demonstrates its value as a foundation for researchers and health authorities to assess population-level
digital proximity tracing app effectiveness by providing an intuitive approach for calculating key performance indicators.
(JMIR Public Health Surveill 2021;7(12):e30004) doi: 10.2196/30004
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In recent efforts to limit the number of COVID-19 infections,
a respiratory disease caused by SARS-CoV-2, digital proximity
tracing apps have been deployed in multiple countries [1,2]. In
Switzerland, the SwissCovid digital proximity tracing app
complements conventional manual contact tracing procedures
that are carried out by cantonal authorities to track the spread
of SARS-CoV-2, regardless of whether an individual has the
voluntary digital proximity tracing app installed or not [3].
Manual contact tracing, in the form of interviews of identified
cases, is labor-intensive and prone to errors due to its reliance
on individuals’ abilities to recall close-range proximity contacts
[4]. Digital proximity tracing apps aim to overcome the
limitations of manual contact tracing [5,6]. Most digital
proximity tracing apps use Bluetooth low-energy beacons to
track proximity contacts within a radius of 2 meters and notify
individuals of a recent exposure to a SARS-CoV-2 clinically
confirmed digital proximity tracing app user [7]. Digital
proximity tracing apps promise to deliver notifications at a faster
rate, with broader reach, and with greater scalability than manual
contact tracing [5,8]. Their increased implementation in
countries is widely associated with improved contact tracing
and transmission mitigation in modeling studies [5,9,10].
There has been a surge of interest in evaluating the effectiveness
of digital proximity tracing apps in mitigating the spread of
SARS-CoV-2. Particular interest is placed on the added benefit
of exposure notifications from digital proximity tracing apps
relative to manual contact tracing in containing nonhousehold
spread [11,12]. For example, recent studies in England [13] and
Switzerland [14] revealed an average of 4 exposure notifications
per index case were triggered by infected app users, which
highlights the considerable breadth of digital proximity tracing
apps over traditional manual contact tracing. However,
attributing the contribution of digital proximity tracing apps on
the mitigative actions taken by exposure notification recipients
is a challenge due to inconsistent data availability [15]. This
proves to be particularly challenging in countries such as
Switzerland, where notified users of the digital proximity tracing
app are not legally mandated to take action as a result of the
exposure notification [16]. Furthermore, there is no unified
methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of digital proximity
tracing apps in mitigating the spread of infection. The lack of
harmonization of terminology, indicator definitions, and
monitoring goals has emerged in recent months as one of the
key challenges in informing health policy about digital proximity
tracing app effectiveness [8].
An approach based on Venn diagrams can be used to assess the
effectiveness of digital proximity tracing apps in mitigating the
spread of the SARS-CoV-2 infection. The use of Venn diagrams
enables a structured approach to count outcomes across several
subpopulations and for each period cross-sectionally. Very
importantly, a Venn diagram approach also provides an intuitive
framework for assessing generalizability and missing population
segments of study data. Hence, when applied to population-level
data, the approach enables the identification and construction
of appropriate indicators in a reproducible manner, given the
available data, to evaluate the impact of digital proximity tracing
apps on users taking mitigative actions. The aim of this study
was to demonstrate the use of Venn diagrams in assessing key
indicators for exposure notification performance and
effectiveness in mitigating the spread of SARS-CoV-2. We




We applied a Venn diagram approach on data from COVID-19
Social Monitor, a nationwide panel study [17,18] of Swiss
residents that allowed for the classification of (1) nonusers of
the SwissCovid app, (2) users of the SwissCovid app and (3)
users of the SwissCovid app who received exposure
notifications, to provide a first description of the possible
influence of exposure notifications on individuals taking
mitigative actions against SARS-CoV-2 spread.
SwissCovid Digital Proximity Tracing App
The Swiss digital proximity tracing app (SwissCovid app) was
launched on June 25, 2020. The adoption of the app in the Swiss
health care system and pandemic mitigation response has been
described extensively in previous studies [14,19]. The
SwissCovid app employs a decentralized privacy-preserving
proximity tracing protocol [2], has been downloaded almost 3
million times [20] for a population of 8.4 million in Switzerland,
and has an estimated 1.7 million active users. App users who
receive exposure notifications are eligible for a free
SARS-CoV-2 test and are instructed to call a federal information
hotline. The hotline elicits further information about the possible
risk exposure and determines if entering into quarantining is
necessary, which happens in approximately 20% of cases [14].
The hotline can only recommend quarantine, which makes
entering into quarantine voluntary, and individuals who choose
to quarantine do not receive salary compensation. By contrast,
mandatory quarantine can be ordered by cantonal health
authorities or a physician through manual contact tracing, and
individuals who are quarantined are entitled to salary
compensation. As of March 2021, 60,000 app users who have
tested positive have triggered exposure notifications, and 70,000
telephone calls to the information hotline have been logged
[20].
Venn Diagram Approach
This approach makes use of Venn diagrams to visualize the
co-occurrence of SARS-CoV-2 outcomes of interest based on
digital proximity tracing app use [21]. To construct the Venn
diagrams, as recently formalized [21], requirements are
established to define the appropriate data sets and time points,
as well as identify subpopulations, to calculate digital proximity
tracing app effectiveness. Based on our experience and extensive
reporting of key indicators to mitigate the spread of
SARS-CoV-2 [2,19,20], we proposed 4 attributes for Venn
diagram development to facilitate the identification of
subpopulations of interest: (1) having been tested for
SARS-CoV-2, (2) having a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result,
(3) having received an exposure notification, and (4) having
entered into quarantine (Table 1).
JMIR Public Health Surveill 2021 | vol. 7 | iss. 12 | e30004 | p. 2https://publichealth.jmir.org/2021/12/e30004
(page number not for citation purposes)
Daniore et alJMIR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SURVEILLANCE
XSL•FO
RenderX










Tested positive; received exposure notification; quaran-
tined
TrueTrueTrueTrueC
Tested positive; did not receive exposure notification;
quarantined
TrueFalseTrueTrueD
Tested negative; received exposure notification; not
quarantined
FalseTrueFalseTrueE1
Not tested; received exposure notification; not quaran-
tined
FalseTrueFalseFalseE2
Tested negative; received exposure notification; quaran-
tined
TrueTrueFalseTrueF1
Not tested; received exposure notification; quarantinedTrueTrueFalseFalseF2
Tested negative; did not receive exposure notification;
quarantined
TrueFalseFalseTrueG1
Not tested; did not receive exposure notification; quar-
antined
TrueFalseFalseFalseG2
Tested negative; did not receive exposure notification;
not quarantined
FalseFalseFalseTrueT
Not tested; did not receive exposure notification, not
quarantined
FalseFalseFalseFalseN
aN/A: not applicable to the applied scope; all individuals who tested positive were immediately placed in isolation.
The allocation of individuals to each subsection, and their
resulting overlap, enabled a more thorough definition of
subpopulations. Once the subpopulations were identified, they
were labeled according to the Venn diagram allocation. These
labels facilitated the calculation of key digital proximity tracing
effectiveness indicators by identifying relevant numerators and
denominators (eg, the number of app users who received
exposure notifications and entered into quarantine versus the
number of app users who received exposure notifications but
did not enter into quarantine). Furthermore, the data
visualizations through Venn diagrams enabled an overview of
available data, time horizons, as well as missing and available
populations for analyses. A Venn diagram approach thereby
provides a general methodology to facilitate the formulation of
research hypotheses, aid the selection of suitable databases, and
help to define key performance indicators by referencing to
specific, labeled diagram segments. For our study, we defined
a priori guiding criteria and definitions (Multimedia Appendix
1) to interpret Venn diagrams in the context of the SARS-CoV-2
pandemic in Switzerland. We also applied targeted questions
(Multimedia Appendix 1) on digital proximity tracing app use
in Switzerland from our panel survey to the Venn diagram
population set.
Data Collection
Data from COVID-19 Social Monitor [17,18] comprise a
representative stratified random survey panel of 3381
participants from Switzerland. Participants were randomly
sampled from an existing web-based market research panel from
a Swiss survey company. The study was launched in March
2020, with 14 survey waves (as of March 2021) which have
been offered every 4 to 6 weeks. The sample was replenished
in December 2020 by recruiting new participants from the same
market research panel to counteract panel attrition.
Our study used data from 4 survey waves: December 14 to
December 23, 2020 (December survey); January 25 to February
4, 2021 (January survey); February 22 to March 3, 2021
(February survey); and March 29 to 08 April 8, 2021 (March
survey). The December survey was used as the baseline for this
study due to high SARS-CoV-2 incidence in Switzerland at that
time, which averaged approximately 4000 newly detected
COVID-19 cases daily and a test positivity rate of 16% [22].
This period encompasses the peak of the second COVID-19
wave in December 2020 and the subsequent decline of infections
in the following months. The January, February, and March
follow-up surveys were used to record information on new
outcomes of interest. Only participants with at least one
follow-up survey were included in our analyses. The first
instance of an event of interest (eg, testing positive for
SARS-CoV-2) was included in our analyses; after the event of
interest, the participant was excluded from further analyses.
Participants with a self-reported positive SARS-CoV-2 test prior
to or at baseline were excluded in order to include only new
infection cases in the assessment period. We also expected that
individuals were likely to react differently to a first receipt of
an exposure notification in comparison to future exposure
notification receipts. Therefore, we also excluded participants
who received exposure notifications prior to or at baseline.
National SARS-CoV-2 incidence and test positivity were also
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extracted to provide context on the state of the pandemic at the
time the surveys were conducted [22,23].
Statistical Analysis
Descriptive statistics were calculated for survey respondent
demographics and to assess mitigative actions taken by the
participants within the study period. Analyses were performed
on the full study sample, as well as across the 3 subgroups of
digital proximity tracing app nonusers and digital proximity
tracing app users who did or did not receive an exposure
notification.
Performance measures were constructed on the basis of labeled
Venn segments representing subpopulations with the attributes
shown in Table 1. We assessed the proportion of individuals
who received SARS-CoV-2 testing, tested positive for
SARS-CoV-2 (including the percentage of individuals who
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 among those who were tested),
or entered into quarantine at the request of health care
professionals or health authorities. The assessment of these
indicators was stratified according to the 3 subgroups defined
by digital proximity tracing app use or nonuse and exposure
notification receipt.
We assessed the mitigative actions taken by individuals who
received an exposure notification. These actions included (1)
calling an information hotline to obtain advice on appropriate
actions, (2) getting tested after receiving an exposure
notification, and (3) entering into quarantine, including entering
into quarantine as recommended by health care professionals
or ordered by health authorities. The assessed key indicators
are derived from the subpopulations observed in the Venn
diagram based on digital proximity tracing app use.
We report 95% confidence intervals based on an exact binomial
test for proportions for the estimation of subpopulation sizes
and key indicators. Analyses were performed in Stata (version
16.1; StataCorp LLC). Continuous variables were represented
as median (interquartile range), and categorical variables were
represented as count (percentage) with corresponding 95%
confidence intervals.
Ethics
For the COVID-19 Social Monitor project, the Ethics Committee
of the Canton of Zurich confirmed that it does not fall under
the Swiss Human Research Law (BASEC-Nr Req-2020-00323).
This exemption was granted due to the fact that data were
collected and treated anonymously throughout the project.
As per the decision of the Cantonal Ethics Commission of
Zurich, explicit informed consent was not needed from
participants for this particular study. However, participants gave
their general permission to be part of research studies when
accepting the invitation to the panel from which we sampled
our respondents. Participation in the study was voluntary, and
participants could withdraw from the study at any time.
Results
Study Population
We included 12,525 assessments from 2403 participants in the
final study cohort (Figure 1). The median respondent age was
49 years (IQR 35-59) and most (2305/2403, 95.9%) respondents
were Swiss nationals (Table 2).
From the study cohort, 319 (319/2403, 13.3%) respondents
reported having at least one of the following chronic illnesses:
asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes,
hypertension, cardiovascular disease, stroke, and cancer.
At the baseline survey (December 2020), 19.3% (236/1222) of
app nonusers, 28.2% (325/1152) of app users who did not
receive an exposure notification, and 34.5% (10/29) of app users
who received an exposure notification reported an average
monthly household income greater than 10,000 CHF
(approximately US $10,886.43).
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Figure 1. Flowchart of assessed panel survey data and associated SARS-CoV-2 incidence values. For the national daily case numbers, the values
represent the daily average of SARS-CoV-2 cases in each month, with the values in parentheses representing their respective standard deviations. EN:
exposure notification.
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Table 2. Respondent demographics, self-reported health risks, and mitigative actions.








40 (29-52)49 (36-59)49 (35-58)49 (35-59)Age (in years), median (IQR)
Gender, n (%)
12 (41.4)566 (49.1)593 (48.5)1171 (48.7)Female
17 (58.6)586 (50.9)629 (51.5)1232 (51.3)Male
Personal status, n (%)
5 (17.2)310 (26.9)353 (28.9)668 (27.8)No partner
24 (82.8)739 (64.1)755 (61.8)1518 (63.2)Living with partner
0 (0.0)103 (8.9)114 (9.3)217 (9.0)Not living with partner
Family status, n (%)
6 (20.7)116 (10.1)123 (10.1)245 (10.2)Has children
23 (79.3)1036 (89.9)1099 (89.9)2158 (89.8)Does not have children
Citizenship, n (%)
27 (93.1)1051 (91.2)1095 (89.6)2173 (90.4)Swiss
1 (3.4)59 (5.1)72 (5.9)132 (5.5)Swiss and other
1 (3.4)42 (3.6)55 (4.5)98 (4.1)Non-Swiss
Language region, n (%)
26 (89.7)965 (83.8)973 (79.6)1964 (81.7)German
1 (3.4)113 (9.8)160 (13.1)274 (11.4)French
2 (6.9)74 (6.4)89 (7.3)165 (6.9)Ticino
Education, n (%)
0 (0.0)22 (1.9)42 (3.4)64 (2.7)Only mandatory schooling
25 (86.2)811 (70.4)901 (73.7)1737 (72.3)Completed professional education
4 (13.8)319 (27.7)279 (22.8)602 (25.1)University or university of applied sciences
Employment status, n (%)
7 (24.1)344 (29.9)370 (30.3)721 (30.0)Not working
22 (75.9)808 (70.1)852 (69.7)1682 (70.0)Currently working
Monthly household income (CHFa), n (%)
5 (17.2)260 (22.6)392 (32.1)657 (27.3)≤6000
11 (37.9)381 (33.1)391 (32.0)783 (32.6)6000-10,000
10 (34.5)325 (28.2)236 (19.3)571 (23.8)>10,000
3 (10.3)186 (16.1)203 (16.6)392 (16.3)No answer
Health risks, n (%)b
9 (31.0)211 (18.3)287 (23.5)507 (21.1)Smoker
1 (3.4)149 (12.9)169 (13.8)319 (13.3)Self-reported chronic illnessc
Mitigative actions, n (%)b
28 (96.6)1140 (99.0)1167 (95.5)2335 (97.2)Always used protective masks when recommended
19 (65.5)804 (69.8)738 (60.4)1561 (65.0)Always stayed at home except for essential tasks
25 (86.2)1097 (95.2)1103 (90.3)2225 (92.6)Always kept recommended distance
16 (55.2)824 (71.5)743 (60.8)1583 (65.9)Always refrained from visits
3 (2-4)3 (1-5)3 (2-5)3 (1-5)Number of physical contacts, median (IQR)
JMIR Public Health Surveill 2021 | vol. 7 | iss. 12 | e30004 | p. 6https://publichealth.jmir.org/2021/12/e30004
(page number not for citation purposes)
Daniore et alJMIR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SURVEILLANCE
XSL•FO
RenderX
aCHF: Swiss franc; At the time of publication, the exchange rate was approximately US $1=0.92 CHF.
bMore than one or no answer is possible; therefore, percentages in this category do not add to 100%.
cAt least one of the following chronic illnesses: asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, stroke,
or cancer.
Baseline Adherence to Mitigation Strategies
During the high-incidence period in December 2020 (ie,
baseline), most participants reported consistent adherence, as
opposed to occasional or no adherence, to wearing protective
masks (2335/2403, 97.2%) and maintaining appropriate distance
(2225/2403, 92.6%) (Table 2). Despite the strongly
recommended restrictions on mobility imposed in winter 2020
throughout Switzerland, 1561 (1561/2403, 65%) respondents
reported leaving their households for nonessential tasks.
On average, 76.8% (938/1222) of app nonusers, 83.9%
(966/1152) of app users who did not receive an exposure
notification, and 75.9% (22/29) of app users who received an
exposure notification reported adherence to at least one of the
4 mitigative measures (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Baseline respondent mitigative actions based on reported SwissCovid app use with 95% confidence intervals. DPT: digital proximity tracing;
EN: exposure notifications.
Population Sizes of Different Venn Diagram Segments
Based on outcomes reported across the 4 survey waves from
December 2020 to March 2021, the respondent sample is
visualized in a Venn diagram according to 4 categories (Figure
3). The corresponding subpopulation sizes for each Venn
diagram segment are shown in Table 3. The sample is further
divided into the 3 respondent subgroups based on digital
proximity tracing app use and receipt of exposure notifications
in order to calculate subgroup-specific indicators. Of note,
segments A and B are empty by design, as all positive tested
individuals are reported immediately to health authorities who,
in turn placed these individuals in isolation (Table 3).
Overall (of the 2403 respondents), 46 (1.9%) respondents tested
positive for SARS-CoV-2 in the follow-up period, 29 (1.2%)
received exposure notifications, and 130 (5.4%) were placed
into quarantine. In segment C, 6 (6/46, 13%) respondents who
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 reported having received an
exposure notification. In segments E1 and F1 (14/29, 48.3%)
were respondents who received exposure notifications and who
tested negative for SARS-CoV-2, of whom 7 (7/29, 24.1%)
respondents in segment F1 were placed into quarantine after
having received exposure notifications. By contrast, in segments
E2 and F2, 9 (9/29, 31%) respondents who received exposure
notifications were not tested for SARS-CoV-2; the respondent
in F2 was still placed into quarantine (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Venn diagram representation of mitigative actions taken by 4 survey subpopulations (in bold) after follow-up: (1) respondents who were
tested for SARS-CoV-2 in the past 4 weeks (white circle), (2) respondents who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 (yellow circle), (3) respondents who
received exposure notifications (red circle), and (4) respondents who were placed in quarantine by Swiss cantonal health services or by a physician
(blue circle). Sample sizes of specific segments are indicated in the diagram, with the values in [square brackets] reflecting the number of DPT app
users in a given segment. Each (non)overlap represents a subpopulation of the survey respondents.
Table 3. Subpopulation cumulative mitigative actions and outcomes from the Venn diagram based on SwissCovid app use after respondent follow-up.
Percentage of entire sample (95% CI)All (n=2403), nApp users, nNonusers, nGroupa











aThe letters correspond to the subpopulations in the Venn diagram in Figure 3.
Indicators Derived From Venn Diagrams
Denominators of subpopulations were selected to assess key
indicators of SwissCovid app performance in reducing the
spread of SARS-CoV-2 based on the mitigative actions taken
and outcomes of interest by respondent groups (Table 4).
Overall, 49.2% (95% CI 47.1%-51.2%) of all participants
reported using the SwissCovid app in at least one follow-up
survey. App users contributed to 57.1% (95% CI 52.7%-61.5%)
of SARS-CoV-2 tests taken, 58.7% (95% CI 43.2%-73%) of
positive SARS-CoV-2 tests and 54.6% (95% CI 45.7%-63.4%)
of respondents who entered into quarantine in our sample.
Test positivity among those who sought SARS-CoV-2 testing
was 8.9% (95% CI 5.5%-13.6%) among app nonusers, 8% (95%
CI 5%-11.9%) among app users who did not receive exposure
notifications, and 30% (95% CI 11.9%-54.3%) among app users
who received exposure notifications.
Entering into quarantine was reported by 4.8% (95% CI
3.7%-6.2%) of the app nonusers, 5% (95% CI 3.8%-6.4%) of
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the app users who did not receive exposure notifications, and
48.3% (95% CI 29.5-67.5%) of the app users who received
exposure notifications. Similarly, entering into quarantine
following testing for SARS-CoV-2 was reported by 19.7% (95%
CI 14.6%-25.7%) of the app nonusers, by 16.7% (95% CI
12.4%-21.7%) of the app users who did not receive exposure
notifications, and by 65% (95% CI 40.8%-84.6%) of the app
users who received exposure notifications.
The percentage of respondents who received exposure
notifications among those who tested positive (22.2%, 95% CI
8.6%-42.3%) for SARS-CoV-2 at a later point in time was
higher than app users who tested negative (5.5%, 95% CI
3%-9%).
Table 4. Selection of appropriate numerators and denominators from a Venn diagram based on SwissCovid digital proximity tracing app use after
respondent follow-up. Letters in square brackets—[]—reflect subpopulations (Venn segments) of app users and those in curly brackets—{}— reflect
the subset of individuals who did not use the app.
% (95% CI)DenominatorNumeratorIndicator
















48.28 (29.45-67.47)[C,E1,E2,F1,F2][C,F1,F2]App user and received exposure notifications
Quarantine (among those tested)
19.72 (14.60-25.70){D,G1,T}{D,G1}Nonuser
16.67 (12.38-21.72)[D,G1,T][D,G1]App user
65.00 (40.78-84.61)[C,E1,F1][C,F1]App user and received exposure notifications
22.22 (8.62-42.26)[C,D][C]App users who received an exposure notification who later
tested positive
5.45 (3.01-8.97)[E1,F1, G1,T][E1,F1]App users who received an exposure notification who later
tested negative
Recommended Actions Taken Upon Receipt of
Exposure Notifications
Recommended mitigative actions taken among respondents
who received an exposure notification (segments C, E1, E2, F1,
F2, n=29) are reported in Multimedia Appendix 1.
Most respondents (17/29, 58.6%) who received exposure
notifications sought SARS-CoV-2 testing and 7 (7/29, 24.1%)
respondents called the federal information hotline. From these
respondents, 22 (22/29, 75.9%) who received an exposure
notification undertook at least one recommended mitigative
action, while 5 (5/29, 17.2%) respondents explicitly stated to
have ignored the exposure notification (Figure 4).
In group C, all 6 individuals reported to have sought testing
after receiving an exposure notification: 4 (4/6, 66.7%)
respondents reported having symptoms, and 2 (2/6, 33.3%)
respondents reported entering into quarantine in response to the
exposure notifications, even though one of these respondents
reported not having symptoms.
Having contact with positive tested individuals or household
members was almost always cited as a quarantine reason in
groups C, F1, and F2 (with 1 exception). However, 5 (71.4%)
out of 7 individuals in group E1 did not report possible contacts
to positive tested individuals as a quarantine reason and yet still
sought testing for SARS-CoV-2.
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Figure 4. Tree diagram of subpopulation mitigative actions after follow-up in response to exposure notifications from the SwissCovid app. MCT:
manual contact tracing.
Discussion
We were able to isolate subpopulations of interest and define
performance indicators for digital proximity tracing app
effectiveness. From our assessment, we found that a greater
proportion of digital proximity tracing app users who received
an exposure notification tested positive, in comparison to digital
proximity tracing app users who did not receive an exposure
notification and digital proximity tracing app nonusers. Our
findings also suggest that the receipt of exposure notifications
may contribute to SARS-CoV-2 transmission mitigation, as
observed with most users from our cohort who voluntarily
sought testing or called the federal information hotline, while
half of these users received recommendations to self-isolate or
quarantine as a result of manual contact tracing. Possible
transmission mitigation was also observed in respondents who
sought testing and who tested positive after receiving exposure
notifications.
A previous cross-sectional analysis [17] of the same database
revealed similar differences between app users and those who
do not use digital proximity tracing apps to those in our study,
namely with respect to citizenship status, household income,
and adherence to mask-wearing. Furthermore, findings on user
response to exposure notifications from our study complement
those from an experimental study [24] in Spain that simulated
exposure notification cascades. The findings of the study [24]
suggested that 10% of individuals who received exposure
notifications called the federal hotline. In our study, follow-up
was sought by 24.1% (7/29) of digital proximity tracing app
users who called the federal hotline after receiving exposure
notifications..
Subpopulations visible in segments E1 (ie, individuals who
tested negative, did not enter into quarantine and received an
exposure notification) and E2 (ie, individuals who did not get
tested, did not enter into quarantine and received an exposure
notification) are currently not captured by any official statistics
in Switzerland. Tracking responses to exposure notifications is
challenging in Switzerland, since no data are systematically
collected on individuals seeking testing after they have received
exposure notifications, such as recording the reason for testing
[25]. Responses to exposure notifications are also voluntary in
Switzerland, making outgoing exposure notification data from
the SwissCovid app inconclusive regarding the actual resulting
mitigative measures taken by the users. In our study, our results
suggest that approximately 1 in 2 individuals who receive
exposure notifications may remain undetected and
approximately 1 in 4 individuals do not respond to exposure
notifications.
Positive test results for SARS-CoV-2 among app users who did
not receive exposure notifications (8%, 95% CI 5%-11.9%)
nonusers were similar (8.9%, 95% CI 5.5-13.6%) and of
comparable magnitude to the officially reported test positivity
values in Switzerland [22]. Notably, test positivity among app
users who received exposure notifications was more than 3
times higher (30%, 95% CI 11.9%-54.3%). A recent report [26]
also revealed similar findings of test positivity among app users
in the Netherlands, which were recently found to be higher for
users who received exposure notifications in comparison to
those who did not. This raises the question of whether exposure
notifications are reflective of an increased exposure risk [27].
Addressing this question is particularly relevant due to concerns
that Bluetooth technology may not be able to capture exposure
risks accurately [28,29]. By using data on digital proximity
tracing app use with Venn diagrams, we presented a novel
approach that evaluates the effect of exposure notifications on
users’ mitigative actions as well as the risk of SARS-CoV-2
transmission through test positivity. However, such
interpretations must account for national risk scoring schemes
to allow for the identification of relevant exposure notifications.
Switzerland, as an example, operates on conservative Bluetooth
attenuation signal thresholds [3], whereas the United Kingdom
has recently adopted lower thresholds in order to capture more
exposures [30].
Our study also illustrates the usability and value of a Venn
diagram approach to contextualize population- or survey-based
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evaluations of exposure notifications. We find that this method,
and the extensive database used in this approach, provide a
visual and analytical basis for assessing digital proximity tracing
app effectiveness. Despite being based on over 12,500 follow-up
surveys, our outcomes of interest such as SARS-CoV-2
infections (46/2403, 1.9%) and exposure notifications
(29/2403,1.2%) were relatively rare. Nevertheless, the sample
is likely well reflective of the population of app users as the
sociodemographic characteristics associated with a higher
propensity for electronic survey participation and SwissCovid
app use likely overlap [17]. In contrary to the findings of another
study [31], however, our database managed to cover all relevant
segments of the Venn diagram, including groups of exposed
contacts who received exposure notifications but did not respond
to the warning. With even larger sample sizes, researchers can
fulfill large enough subpopulation sizes to generate possible
direct inference on digital proximity tracing effectiveness from
the associated denominators. A current approach to evaluate
the role of digital proximity tracing in the SARS-CoV-2
pandemic was presented in a recent study on factors associated
with app use in Switzerland [17] and their associated
effectiveness on the app notification cascade [14,19]. Another
recent study [13] conducted in the United Kingdom also traced
exposure notifications to a substantial number of individuals
with nonhousehold risk exposures. By providing
subpopulation-level granularity, a Venn diagram approach
complements current evaluations of the role of digital proximity
tracings in curbing SARS-CoV-2 transmission. This is
particularly relevant in countries similar to Switzerland, where
exposure notifications do not mandate mitigative actions from
users [16].
Limitations
Our study has some limitations. Due to the scarcity of relevant
digital proximity tracing–related exposure notification outcomes,
our study had limited statistical power. Owing to the mode of
data collection (web-based panel surveys), the respondents in
our sample may reflect subpopulations with above-average
literacy and, possibly, higher adherence to recommended
preventive actions against the SARS-CoV-2 infection.
Therefore, our results might not be generalizable to the broader
Swiss population. Also, while survey respondents are provided
full anonymity, partial non- or overreporting of having received
exposure notifications, of SARS-CoV-2 testing and positivity,
as well as of nonadherence to measures, might have occurred.
Furthermore, considering the small sample size of participants
who received an exposure notification, findings of possible
associated mitigative responses should be viewed as preliminary.
Nevertheless, given the privacy-preserving nature of digital
proximity tracing app design, survey-based exposure notification
studies are among the few sources of data available to make
assessments on their effectiveness in mitigating the spread of
infection. As such, despite the limitations presented by surveys
in including participants who received exposure notifications,
our results are some of the first available to provide quantitative
insights on the contribution of exposure notifications in digital
proximity tracing app users taking mitigative actions. Lastly,
the panel data did not provide enough granularity to recreate
the full cascade sequence of risk exposure. Rather, the panel
survey focused on gathering information on digital proximity
tracing usage and associated mitigative actions yet not
information on the premise surrounding any possible exposure
notifications. Therefore, our data cannot univocally demonstrate
causality of exposure notifications and SARS-CoV-2
transmission prevention.
Conclusion
In our paper, we presented the Venn diagram as a tool to
facilitate and streamline the evaluation of the role of digital
proximity tracing apps in curbing the spread of the SARS-CoV-2
virus. By isolating subpopulations through a Venn diagram
approach, a higher proportion of digital proximity tracing app
users who tested positive after receiving an exposure notification
was observed in comparison to digital proximity tracing app
users who did not receive an exposure notification or digital
proximity tracing app nonusers. Our findings also revealed that
more than 3 out of 4 digital proximity tracing app users who
received exposure notifications performed at least one
recommended mitigative action, such as seeking SARS-CoV-2
testing or calling a federal information hotline, while half of
these users received a recommendation to self-isolate or
quarantine. An assessment, using a Venn diagram approach, of
a larger population than the one presented in our study would
allow the opportunity to assess the effectiveness of digital
proximity tracing apps on users taking mitigative actions and
their associated exposure risk with greater statistical power.
This could, in turn, assist health authorities and researchers in
identifying possible areas of improvement for digital proximity
tracing apps alone, or in combination with manual contact
tracing, by assessing effectiveness in curbing the spread of
infection in a reproducible manner.
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